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The Overlooked Costs of Religious Deference
Robin Fretwell Wilson*
Abstract
Citing the Qur'an, a German divorce court judge this year denied a fast-
track divorce to a Muslim woman who had been the victim of domestic violence
and death threats from her husband. The judge rejected her application
because the husband's exercise of his "right to castigate does not fulfill the
hardship criteria"for an expedited divorce. The decision, which sparked a
firestorm of controversy, comes at an important time in the movement to
embrace pluralistic understandings of family relationships. Scholars and
policymakers around the world are advancing various schemes for sharing
state control over domestic disputes with religious groups-ranging from
proposals to share jurisdiction over family disputes with religious bodies to
enforcing religious understandings, like any other prenuptial agreement.
This Article asks how women and children will fare in a system of
religious deference. It maintains that the state has an important protective
function to play for these traditionally vulnerable groups. Enforcing certain
religious understandings of marital relationships will likely undermine a
woman 's ability to exit the relationship and, consequently, prevent her from
policing the conduct in her own relationship and with respect to her children.
Policymakers should proceed cautiously with any proposal to hand over
authority for marital disputes since family violence occurs in religious
communities, as it does throughout society, but is tolerated by some religious
leaders and adherents. Drawing on our experience with faith-based
exemptions to the duty to provide medical care for children, this Article
concludes that the costs ofgiving greater deference to religious understandings
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law; J.D., 1995,
University of Virginia; B.A., 1989, University of Virginia. I would like to thank the participants
in this Symposium, the panel on The Interface of Family Law and Religion at the International
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and the conference on multi-tiered marriage at Pepperdine University School of Law for their
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offamily relationships must seriously be considered before we are willing to
rob women and children of the state's protections.
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I. Introduction
In March of 2007, Der Spiegel reported that a German divorce court judge
denied a fast-track divorce based on hardship to a German citizen of Moroccan
origin who had been the victim of domestic violence and death threats from her
spumed husband. 1 In rejecting the application, the judge relied on a passage in
the Qur'an that she read as permitting a man to castigate his wife.2 The judge
explained that the husband's exercise of his "right to castigate does not fulfill the
hardship criteria," one of the grounds for an expedited divorce in Germany.
3
1. Veit Medick& Anna RemiannA German Judge Cites Koran in Divorce Case, DER SPEGEL,
Mar. 21, 2007, available at httpJ/www.spiegel.de/intemational/germany/0,1518,473 017,00.html (last
visited Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. Id
3. Id Ironically, if the plaintiff had been a Moroccan citizen, the judge would have applied
Moroccan law. See MARION BOYD, DISurrE RESOLurnON IN FAMILY LAW: PROIEC"iNG CIolcE,
PROMOTING INCUJSION 83 (2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In Germany,
the citizenship of the party to a dispute detemines what fkmily law will apply ifthat party is
not a German citizen, although "this general principle is, ofcourse, subject to Genran public
order and to any international conventions to which Germany is a party."... [Als a result,
German courts have had to deal with the interpretation and application of foreign laws,
including Sharia.
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A firestorm of controversy erupted in response to the ruling.4 Feminists read it as
giving the husband the right to beat his wife.5 Muslim scholars disputed whether the
Qur'an authorized physical violence against a spouse.6
When challenged on the ruling and asked to recuse herself, the judge again cited
the Qur'an--this time citing a passage that says that a man's honor is injured when his
wife acts in an unchaste manner.7 Legislators across the spectrum then weighed in.
One called the ruling "an extreme violation of the rule of law," while another labeled it
a "sad example of how the conception of law from another legal and cultural
environment is taken as the basis of our own notion of law."9
As this case unfolds, a vibrant movement is taking hold-both in the United
States and outside it-to give greater deference to religious understandings of family
relations.' In the last year, numerous academics in the United States have proposed
various schemes for sharing state control over domestic disputes with religious
groups.1 This Article argues that the effect of these proposals would be to pull the
state out of marriage. While the proposals focus largely on the theoretical desirability
of pluralistic understandings of marriage, they overlook pragmatic concems that arise:
What happens to women and children in a system of religious deference?
This Article maintains that the state has an important protective function to
play for traditionally vulnerable groups, a function that should not be lightly set
aside. Binding women who want to exit a marriage to a religious community's
norms-whether by enforcing religious contracts or ceding jurisdiction over
Id (quoting PASCALE FOuRNER, APPLICABILIrY OF SHARLA/MusLim LAw IN WSIERN LI3ERAL STATES
(2004)). Under Moroccan law, the woman would have been entitled to a divorce, thanks to a series of
family law reforms in 2004 that specifically allow divorce for harm, including intimate violence. FAMILY
CODE pmbl., § 7 (2004) (Morocco), translated in Global Rights, The Moroccan Family Code
(Moudawana) ofFebruary5, 2004, at5 (2005), http Avww.globahights. org/si&DcServer/Moudawana-
EnglishTranslation.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2008) (defining harm to include "lack of financial support,
abandonment, violence, and other harm, in view of endorsing the general legal principle: 'neither harm
nor be harmed,' [in order] to promote equality and equity between the two spouses") (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. See Medrick& Reimann, supra note 1 (reporting that numerous politicians "voiced their horror
at the verdict" and "demanded disciplinary action against the judge").
5. See i. (noting the opinions of members of Terre des Femmes and the Network for Muslim
Women).
6. Id.; see also infra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing disputed interpretations of
religious texts).
7. Medick & Reimann, supra note 1.
8. Id
9. Id
10. See infra Part 1.
I. Id
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marriage to religious authorities-will raise the costs of exiting, undermine a
woman's ability to exit, and prevent her from privately regulating the conduct
in her own relationship and with respect to her children.
Part II surveys three proposals that would give greater deference to
religious understandings of marriage and family relations, ranging from
proposals to share jurisdiction over family disputes with religious bodies to
enforcing religious understandings like any other prenuptial agreement. Part In
then marshals empirical evidence showing that domestic violence occurs in
religious communities, like it does in other parts of society. This Part shows
not only that violence will occur, but that religious leaders and community
members frequently tolerate "wife-abuse" and other forms of domestic
violence. 12 This tolerance stems in part from the belief that "the marriage
[must] be maintained"'13 at all costs.
Part IV maps out important breaks between some religious understandings
of marriage and the rules society would otherwise apply, and argues that
religious deference will have the effect of trapping some women in abusive
relationships. Although the proposals outlined in Part II would not enforce
religious understandings about the care of children, this Part argues that
enforcing religious understandings about the adult relationship and financial
matters cannot so neatly be divorced from the child's well-being. Part V
concludes with cautionary lessons from another context in which society gives
great religious deference-faith-based denials of medical treatment-and urges
that the human costs of deference are far greater than these proposals blithely
assume.
II. Proposals for Religious Deference
Several proposals have emerged over the last year advocating greater
deference to religious understandings of marriage and family relationships. In
one proposal, the state would cede some of its jurisdiction over family disputes to
religious groups, while other proposals advocate the total abolition of state-sponsored
marriage and a move to a purely contractarian form of domestic relationships. While
different in many key respects, each proposal shares a common,
12. See S. Dould et al., Violence Against Women in Arab and Islamic Countries, 6 ARCHIVES
WoMEN's MENTAL HEALTH 165, 168 (2003) (discussing the "conspiracy of silence" in which various
community members fail to adequately report or persecute instances of domestic violence).
13. Ruksana Ayyub, Domestic Violence in the South Asian Muslim Immigrant Population in the
United States, 9 J. Soc. DSTRESS & HOMELESS 237,243 (2000).
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dangerous assumption: that protections for women and children can be preserved
in a system of greater religious autonomy without substantial state oversight of
marriage.
One such proposal comes from Professor Joel Nichols. 14 Nichols
advocates that the government should cede some of its jurisdictional
authority over marriage and divorce to religious communities, which, in
turn, would allow for multiple understandings of family relations. 15
Nichols draws on New York's get statute and the covenant marriage
statutes in three states to argue for greater accommodation of Muslim,
Jewish, Christian, and other religious understandings of marriage.
16
Under a "multi-tiered" system of marriage, couples could choose a civil
marriage with "minimal formalities" and hurdles to exit, but "capable and
competent parties" would also be able to "enter more binding unions
under the auspices of their religious traditions" if they so desire. 17
Religious communities could then "draw upon their own theological and
legal resources to aid in governing their adherents."' 18 Crucially, Nichols
would accommodate multiple understandings of family relations only so
long as "we are careful to balance that pluralism with protections for
women and children."'19
Taking the idea of removing state authority over marriage even
further, Professor Edward Zelinsky sets forth a "pro-marriage case for
abolishing civil marriage," largely in response to the debate about gay
20 himarriage and the future of marriage. Under his proposal, marriage
would be a religious and cultural institution with no legal definition or
status. 2' For Zelinsky, abolishing civil marriage would depoliticize and
14. See Joel A. Nichols, Multi-Tiered Marriage: Ideas and Influences from New York and
Louisiana to the International Community, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 135,140-41 (2007) ('"hisArticle
posits that... religious groups have an appropriate role to play in assisting the state to define the metes and
bounds of the marital relationship.").
15. See id. at 195-96 ("[I]t is unnecessary for the state to retain sole jurisdictional control over a
unitary, least-common-denominator system of marriage and divorce law.").
16. See id at 148-54 (discussing the background and theory behind covenant marriage law in
Louisiana, Arkansas, and Arizona and the get statute in New York).
17. Id. at 138,196.
18. Id at 196.
19. Id at 140.
20. Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Casefor Abolishing Civil
Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161,1165 (2006).
21. See id at 1220 ("Whatever the arguments for civil marriage might have been in the past, today
perpetuating the monopoly that is civil marriage is a mistake. The time has come to rectify that mistake by
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"strengthen marriage by encouraging competition among alternative
versions of marriage., 2 2  Zelinsky sees the "law following the
deregulation of marriage [as] both contractual and pluralistic. ''2 3 He
envisions a "regime [that] would be heavily contractual in nature as the
secular and sectarian sponsors of marriage develop their own agreements
for couples," which the courts would then enforce, as they would any
other contract. 24 The one specific exception to enforcement for Zelinsky
would be when it would impair the state's ability to protect the interests
of minor children.25
In a third proposal, Professor Daniel Crane also argues that states
should separate religious marriage from civil unions. 6 He envisions a
system in which "the state would no longer attempt to define the
parameters of marriage or to specify mandatory rules other than those
necessary to preserve the minimum values of a liberal state. ' 2 7 Thus, the
state's role as to marriage would be limited "to enforcing contracts
between private parties."28 The functional result of this arrangement,
Crane states, is that a couple voluntarily could delegate jurisdiction over
their marriage to a specified religious institution which would apply
religious law.2 9 Like Nichols and Zelinsky, Crane would hold the parties
to this religious understanding so long as it conforms to the "minimal
norms of [a] liberal democratic society."3 °
Despite their different formulations, Nichols, Zelinsky, and Crane
each share the idea that society can embrace pluralism without sacrificing
protections for women and children. 3' This is a dangerous assumption.
Two concerns immediately arise: first, whether family violence is likely
abolishing civil marriage.").
22. Id. at 1173.
23. Id. at 1182.
24. Id. at 1219.
25. See id at 1184 ("[C]ourts (and legislatures) in a world without civil marriage should not
invalidate voluntary arrangements except upon very compelling grounds, e.g., to protect minor children').
26. See Daniel A. Crane, A "Judeo-Christian"ArgwnentforPrivatizingManiage, 27 CARDoZOL
REV. 1221, 1222 (2006) (contending that marriage is the province of the religion and not the state and
arguing "against the secular legalization ofmarriage and in favor ofthe secular privatizaion ofmarriage").
27. Id at 1250.
28. Id. at 1252.
29. See id. (examining the scenario in which a couple could sign a prenuptial agreement agreeing
that a religious tribunal would arbitate any dispute concerning their marriage).
30. Id at 1253.
31. See supra notes 14,20, and 26.
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to occur in religious communities; and second, if violence is likely to
occur, what effect would these proposals have on the state's ability to
police that violence. As the next Part explains in detail, family violence
does occur in religious communities, and the victims of violence often
receive little or no support from the religious community itself for exiting
32the marriage.
11. Family Violence in Religious Communities
Deference to religious understandings would not be troubling if
society could predict with confidence that the safety and welfare of
traditionally vulnerable groups-women and children-would not be
impaired.33 Yet the triumvirate of family violence (domestic violence,
child physical abuse, and child sexual abuse) is more likely to occur in
insular, patriarchal communities in which women have little power or
influence34--raising questions about how women and children will fare if
society hands over greater authority to religious groups. 35
Despite the presence of these classic risk factors, researchers have
found it surprisingly difficult to measure the incidence of family violence
within religious groups. 36  The empirical studies that have been
32. SeeinfraPartffi.
33. Other scholars have also argued that giving greater autonomy to cultural groups puts the less
powerfihl in those groups, often women and children, at a further disadvantage. See, e.g., Natasha Bakht,
FamilyArbitration Using Sharia Law: Examining Ontario sArbitrationActandItsImpacton Women, 1
MusuM WoRLDJ. HuM. RTS. 1, 18 (2004) (arguing that a "regressive interpretation ofSharia will be used
to seriously undermine the rights of women").
34. See EMERSON DOBASH & RussELLDOBASH, ViOLENcEAGAINSTWIVES: ACASEAGAINSTTHE
PATRIARCHY 33 (1983) ("The seeds ofwife beating lie in the subordination of females and their subjection
to male authority and control."); David Finkelhor, Risk Factors in the Sexual Victimization of Children, 4
CuLDABUsE&NEGLECT 265,269 (1980) (finding in a study of796 college undergraduates that "[w]hen
a father has particularly conservative family values, for example, believing stronglyin children's obedience
and in the subordination of women, a daughter is more at risk for sexual abuse").
35. See VIRGINIA RAmEY Mou.ENKoTr, WOMEN, MEN, AND THE BIBLE 23-24 (1989)
(acknowledging that while the Bible promotes mutual submission, both Roman Catholicism and many
Protestant churches lend their support to patriarchal dominance and repressive authoritarianism);
Muhammad M. Haj-Yahia, Wife Abuse and Battering in the Sociocultural Context ofArab Society, 39
FA .PROcEsS 237, 252 (2000) [hereinafter Haj-Yahia, Battering in Arab Society] ("In Arab societies,
power in marital relations is based on patriarchal principles, and equality is not considered a central
value.").
36. See Anahid Dervartanian Kulwicki & June Miller, Domestic Violence in the Arab
American Population: Transforming Environmental Conditions Through Community
Education, 20 ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 199, 204 (1999) (explaining that studies on
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undertaken reveal a complex pattern of intimate partner abuse and child
abuse in religious communities.37 As this Part documents, religious
observance is, on the one hand, weakly protective of both adults and
children from family violence. On the other hand, these studies show
that abuse nonetheless occurs in religious communities.
A. The Influence of Religious Participation
Studies of family violence reveal that religion is sometimes weakly
protective against the risk of domestic violence. For example, a study by
Ellison and colleagues in 1999 found that men and women who attend
religious services regularly are less likely to commit acts of domestic
violence than persons who attend rarely or not at all.38 A second study of
Protestant male believers found a similar phenomenon: "[A]ctive
conservative Protestant husbands are significantly less likely to commit
domestic violence compared to active mainline Protestant husbands as
well as nominal conservative Protestant husbands.
3 9
Although religious participation confers some protection, these same
studies show that domestic violence and child abuse will occur in
religious communities, like they do in any other.40 Moreover, when they
occur, the victims of the violence receive little support for exiting the
relationship from community members and religious leaders.4
domestic violence among Arab American immigrants had to be conducted with home interviews
"[blecause of the high percentage of illiteracy in both Arabic and English, and because of the
cultural norm related to the reluctance of Arab Americans to discuss sensitive questions outside
their homes").
37. See W. BRADFORD WILCOX, SOFT PATRIARCHS, NEW MEN: How CHRISTIANITY SHAPES
FATHERS AND HUSBANDS 181-82 (2004) ("Nominal conservative Protestant husbands... are
significantly more abusive than unaffiliated husbands, active conservative Protestant husbands,
and nominal mainline Protestant husbands."); Christopher W. Dyslin & Cynthia J. Thomsen,
Religiosity and Risk of Perpetrating Child Physical Abuse: An Empirical Investigation, 33 J.
PSYCHOL. & THEOLOGY 291, 296 (2005) (finding that conservative Protestant religious
affiliation is not related to physical child abuse, but that extrinsic religiosity among conservative
Protestants is linked to child abuse risk).
38. See Christopher G. Ellison et al., Are There Religious Variations in Domestic
Violence?, 20 J. FAM. ISSUES 87, 104 (1999) ("[T]he frequency of attending religious services
bears an inverse relationship to the likelihood of perpetrating abuse for both men and women.").
39. WILCOX, supra note 37, at 182.
40. See Ellison et al., supra note 38, at 87 ("[I]ntimate violence is the most prevalent form
of interpersonal violence in the United States.").
41. See infra Part III.B.
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There are countless anecdotes that domestic abuse is on the rise in Muslim
communities42 or prevalent among Conservative Protestants. 43 An empirical literature
is also emerging. A study of 291 married Arab women in Israel by Dr. Muhammad
Haj-Yahia demonstrates the prevalence of domestic violence in Arab religious
communities, albeit abroad.44 In that study, "[81%] ofthe participants knew of women
who had experienced verbal and psychological abuse by their husbands; [while] 78%
knew of Arab women who had experienced 'moderate physical violence' (slapping,
pulling hair or clothes, pushing)." 5 Nearly two-thirds, 64%, knew Arab women who
had experienced "severe physical violence," defined as "hard pushing at frequent
intervals, attacking the wife and throwing her body against the wall, or attacking the
wife with a hard object such as a chair, belt or stick.
4 6
Studies of domestic violence among conservative Protestant husbands also
show that domestic violence is a reality for many families.47 Using the second
National Survey of Families and Households ("NSFH2"), Professor Brad Wilcox
found that "4.8 percent of conservative Protestant married men with children
committed domestic violence in the year prior to NSFH2, compared to 4.3 percent
of mainline Protestant married men with children and 3.2 percent of unaffiliated
married men with children., 48 Although the differences for these groups were not
statistically significant, when Wilcox took church attendance into account, the
"differences between religious groups [became] statistically significant., 49 Wilcox
42. See Fatima Agha AI-Hayani, Arabs and the American Legal System: Cultural and
Political Ramifications, in ARABS IN AMERICA: BUILDING A NEW FUTURE 74, 80 (Michael W.
Suleiman ed., 1999). Al-Hayani states:
Almost all lawyers have admitted that cases of domestic violence among Arabs are on
the rise.... Domestic violence seems to be on the rise for various reasons, such as
availability of economic independence for the wife through public assistance, a
situation that diminishes the husband's control over his wife and family and creates
friction and discord within the family.
Id.
43. See Ellison et al., supra note 38, at 89 ("[I1f some popular images are accurate,
Conservative Protestant (i.e., fundamentalist and evangelical) affiliation and belief may be linked
with an elevated risk of domestic violence, particularly by men.").
44. See Haj-Yahia, Battering in Arab Society, supra note 35, at 242,244 (reporting results of
a survey of 291 women in Israel, 72% of whom were Muslim, 18% Christian, and 10% Druze).
45. Id. at 244.
46. Id.
47. Wilcox classified any denomination that "adhere[s] to a theologically conservative
worldview as conservative," including Pentecostal, Baptists, Anabaptists, Southern Baptists,
Church of God in Christ, and Reformed Churches. WILCOX, supra note 37, at 15.
48. Id. at 181.
49. Id.
1371
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found that "[n]ominal conservative Protestant husbands have a domestic violence rate
of 7.2 percent and are significantly more abusive than unaffiliated husbands, active
conservative Protestant husbands, and nominal mainline Protestant husbands." 50
Like domestic violence, child physical abuse also occurs in religious
communities. Here the studies have focused less on Arab religious communities than
on conservative Christian communities. One study by Professors Christopher Dyslin
and Cynthia Thomsen is particularly instructive. Motivated largely by the popular
belief that "Conservative Protestants"'" engage in more corporal punishment than the
rest of society, Dyslin and Thomsen explored whether religious affiliation or mere
religiosity was related to child physical abuse rislc12 Because many states specifically
authorize corporal punishment of children, the researchers distinguished mere
spanking from child physical abuse, which they defined to "entail[] more extreme
forms of physical aggression," such as being hit with a fist, burned, or choked.
3
Although the results showed that conservative Protestant religious affiliation was
not related to child physical abuse risk, the researchers found that "[i]ndividuals with
high levels of extrinsic religiosity had higher [child abuse proneness]" than those
individuals with lower extrinsic religiosity.54 Extrinsic religiosity is akin to wearing
one's religion on one's sleeve; it places an emphasis on religion as membership in a
"powerful in-group," 5 providing protection, consolation, and social status.
5 6
Just as domestic violence and child physical abuse occur in religious
communities, so does child sexual abuse. Studies of sexual abuse have found that
while religious affiliation mutes a child's risk of sexual abuse in early childhood,
50. Id. at 181-82.
51. Dyslin & Thomsen, supra note 37, at 33 (classifying the following as conservative
Protestants: Adventists, Assemblies of God, Baptists, Church of God in Christ, Evangelical Free
Foursquare Gospel, Full Gospel, Holiness, Missouri or Wisconsin Synod Lutheran, Nazarene, Non-
denominational (Evangelical), Pentecostal, and Wesleyan).
52. See id. at 292-93 (employing the Child Abuse Potential Inventory to measure
participants' attitudes towards abuse, as opposed to self-reports of behavior).
53. Id. at 292 ("[D]espite a general tendency to conflate the two, corporal punishment and
[child physical abuse] are not isomorphic.").
54. Id. at 296.
55. Vicky Genia & Dale G. Shaw, Religion, Intrinsic-Extrinsic Orientation, and Depression,
32 REv. REL. RES. 274, 274 (1991).
56. See generally Gordon W. Allport & J. Michael Ross, Personal Religious Orientation
and Prejudice, 5 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 432 (1967); see also Wilcox, supra note 37, at
129 (finding that "conservative Protestant fathers are more likely to report using corporal
punishment," but also "are more likely to praise and hug their children and less likely to yell at
them than are mainline Protestant and unaffiliated fathers").
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there are nonetheless pockets of elevated risk among some religious groups in
adolescence.57
Together, these studies show not that being a member of a religious community
makes one more likely to be a victim of domestic violence or child abuse, but instead
that family violence will occur in religious communities like it does elsewhere. For
this reason, it is important to examine the views of religious communities and their
leaders toward family violence before embracing any proposal to give greater
deference to religious groups.
B. Tolerance by Religious Communities of Family Violence
Studies across multiple faiths reveal that victims of family violence often find
cold comfort in their religious communities, whether from religious leaders or other
members. Religious groups often acquiesce in or, worse, condone family violence
within the community.
Because this Symposium focuses on Gender-Relevant Legislative Change
in Muslim and Non-Muslim Countries, this Part principally examines studies of
family violence among adherents to the Islamic Faith.58 A 1999 study by
Professors Anahid Kulwicki and June Miller evidences the tacit acceptance of
domestic violence by some Muslim communities in the United States.5 9 In that
survey of Arab American immigrants, nearly all of whom were Muslim, 60 the
57. See Rebecca M. Bolen, Predicting Risk to Be Sexually Abused: A Comparison of
Logistic Regression to Event HistoryAnalysis, 3 CHILDMALTREATMENT 157, 167, 168tbl.2(1998)
(finding that Protestant and Catholic children had odds ratios of less than one for experiencing
child sexual abuse when compared to children with no religious affiliation, meaning that they were
much less likely to be sexually abused, but also reporting that Protestant children, although
"significantly less likely to be abused in early childhood... were more likely to be abused during
adolescence"; this increase in their relative risk was on par with other risk factors that intuitively
impact a child's risk of sexual abuse, such as living with a male in the household); Ruth Stout-
Miller et al., Religiosity and Child Sexual Abuse: A Risk Factor Assessment, 6 J. CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE 15,23,30-31 (1997) (finding in a survey of 397 freshmen students at a southern university
that among individuals who had been sexually abused as a child, persons who came from
"fundamental Protestant" religious family backgrounds-defined as Baptist, Southern Baptist,
Church of Christ, Church of God, Pentecostal, and Holiness-were more at risk of being sexually
abused by a relative, and concluding that "the type of religious affiliation and involvement in
religious activities (measured as frequency of church attendance and practice of religious beliefs at
home) affect the nature and extent of child sexual abuse").
58. For a more in-depth look at patterns of family violence in other faiths, see Robin Fretwell
Wilson, The Perils of Privatized Marriage, in MULTi-TERED MARRIAGE (Joel Nichols ed., 2008).
59. See Kulwicki & Miller, supra note 36, at 207 tbl. 1.
60. See id. (reporting that 97.5% of the survey respondents were Muslim).
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researchers asked women and men "when it would be appropriate for husbands
to slap their wives.' ,6 1 Women were more accepting of this practice than men in
a number of different circumstances, ranging from when a wife disrespects her
husband in the home when no one else is around62 to when the husband
discovers that his wife is cheating.63 Perhaps most shocking, 18.2% of women
in the study said they would "approve" of a husband killing his wife if he
discovered adultery.64
Other studies mirror Kulwicki and Miller's findings. A study conducted
by Haj-Yahia of 356 Jordanian women, 92% of whom were Muslim, found that
"Jordanian women have a strong tendency to justify wife-beating., 65 Haj-Yahia
found that 33.4% "agreed or strongly agreed that a husband ha[d] the right to
beat his wife if she challenged [his] manhood" and 46.6% agreed or strongly
agreed if a wife "constantly disobey[ed] her husband., 66 Moreover, 68.5%
"agreed or strongly agreed that a husband ha[d] the right to beat his wife.., if
she [didn't] respect her husband's parents or siblings. 67 Indeed, Jordanian
women often blamed the wife for violence against her. Almost half agreed that
in most cases "a husband beats his wife due to her mistaken behavior, such as
squandering money or neglecting the house and children," or that "the wife's
behavior toward her husband or children is the cause of violence against her.,
68
61. d. at 209tbl.3.
62. See id. (showing that 34.8% offemale respondents would approve ofaman slapping his wifeif
she insults him when they are at home alone, compared to 33.3% of male respondents).
63. See id. (showing that 48.4% of female respondents approve of a man slapping his wife if he
learns that she has been having an affair, compared to 22.5 % of men). The researchers also asked when it
would be appropriate for a man to slap his wife in other circumstances and received these responses:
She won't do what he tells her to do 20.4 5.1
She insults him in public 17.2 43.6
She comes home drunk 56.3 51.4
She hits him first when they have an argumnent 58.7 59.0
64. Id The researchers did not have a large enough sample to present parallel statistics for men on
this question.
65. Muhammad M. Haj-Yahia, Beliefs ofJordanian Women About Wife-Beating, 26 PSYCHOL.
WOMEN Q. 282, 284-85 (2002) [hereinafter Haj-Yahia, Jordanian Beliefs].
66. Id. at 286.
67. Id.
68. See id. (reporting that 41.8% and 47.5% of the participants strongly agreed or agreed
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Muslim men share these views, as well. In 1998, Haj-Yahia surveyed
Palestinian men from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the majority of whom
were Muslim. 69 Nearly a quarter, and sometimes more than two-thirds of the
respondents, justified wife beating when a wife engaged in sexual infidelity,
insulted the husband in front of his friends, challenged the husband's manhood,
disobeyed the husband, failed to meet the husband's expectations, refused to
have sex with the husband, disrespected the husband's parents and relatives, or
reminded the husband of his weak points.70
It is not only community members who accept violence; religious leaders
often tolerate domestic violence as well. A study by Ruksana Ayyub
examining domestic violence among South Asian Muslims in the United States
observed that "[v]iolence in marriage is generally condemned but when it does
happen the religious community gives no clear consequences for the violent
behavior."' Acquiescence among South Asian Muslims is so pervasive that
"Islamic Centers themselves fail to impart any information on domestic
violence protection and prevention programs available in the community,
seeing them as too radical.
7 2
This tolerance of family violence stems both from sharply-contested
readings of religious texts73 and from the belief that "the marriage [must] be
with the statements presented in the text, and concluding that "[tihe results revealed a strong tendency
among Jordanian women to blame the wife for violence against her"). Compare Haj-Yahia, Battering in
Arab Society, supra note 35, at 245 (finding that among 291 married Arab women living in Israel, 82%
did not believe that husbands have a right to beat their wives in certain situations, but of the 8% who did
agree, 73% felt that beating would bejustified in the event ofthe wife's sexual infidelity, 64% said beating
would bejustified if the wife fails to conform with the husband's demands, requests, and expectations; and
49% believed beating would be justified if the wife talks back to the husband at home).,
69. See Muhammad M. Haj-Yahia, Beliefs About Wife Beating Among Arab Men From Israel:
The Influence of TheirPatriawrhal Ideology, 18 J. F AM. VIOLENCE 193,196 (2003) [hereinafter Haj-Yahia,
Battering Beliefs in Israel] ("Eighty two percent of the respondents were Muslim..., 13% were
Christian .... and 5% were Druze....").
70. See id at 199. Although most respondents were Muslim, men from multiple religious
backgrounds justified domestic violence. See id. ("[A] substantial proportion of the [male] respondents
justified wife beating. Fifty-eight percent strongly agreed or agreed that 'there is no excuse for a man to
beat his wife'. . . whereas about 28% strongly agreed or agreed that 'sometimes it is OK for a man to beat
his wife' . ... Moreover, between 15 and 62% strongly agreed or agreed that wife beating is justified on
certain occasions.").
71. Ayyub, supranote 13, at242.
72. Id.
73. Some scholars note that portions of the Qur'an "clearly imply that obedience and respect for
husbands is the Muslim wife's duty and that in some situations wife-beating is justified." Haj-Yahia,
Jordanian Beliefs, supra note 65, at 283. They rely on Sura 4:34, which provides:
Men are the maintainers of women because Allah has made some of them to excel
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maintained. 7 4 The emphasis on family privacy, family reputation, and family
solidarity makes maintenance of the marriage and family unit of paramount
importance, as a result of which "abusiveness almost becomes invisible.
75
Beyond tacit acceptance, some religious groups actually discourage women
from seeking outside help.76 Professor Ayyub explains that the Muslim community
"condemns any woman who seeks legal protection from an abusive spouse. ' 77 Dr.
Haj-Yahia notes that an Arab woman who seeks to have her husband removed from
the home "may be ostracized by [her] community and blamed for undermining
family stability and unity."78 Preserving the marriage is of such great importance
that physical violence is seen by some members as "preferable to divorce.
79
Tolerance of family violence is not limited to members of the Islamic
faith. Similar studies of religious leaders from Christian traditions confirm
that they also frequently acquiesce in physical violence between husbands
and wives. A 2000 study of 158 Christian religious leaders found that many
others and because they spend out of their property, the good women are therefore
obedient, guarding the unseen as Allah has guarded; and (as to) those on whose
part you fear desertion, admonish them, and leave them alone in the sleeping-places
and beat them ....
Under this reading of Islamic law, "a refractory wife has no legal right to object to her husband's
exercising his disciplinary authority." Douki et al., supra note 12, at 168. Such verses are not
uniformly interpreted; some scholars argue that the Qur'an allows only a "symbolic beating of a
wife if she disobeys," while others "cling to a more literal meaning." Ayyub, supra note 13, at
242. A "selective preference of one verse from the Qur'an over many other verses that talk
about kindness and justice toward women has created an atmosphere that tolerates and allows
violence toward women." Id. Similar disputes arise about Biblical passages. See, e.g., Dyslin
& Thomsen, supra note 37, at 295.
74. Ayyub, supra note 13, at 243.
75. Id. at 243; see also Douki et al., supra note 12, at 166 ("Arab families tend to
emphasize mutual support, and individual members are expected to sacrifice their own needs,
well-being and welfare for the benefit of the family as a unit.").
76. See Ayyub, supra note 13, at 239 ("Muslim women in America look for and find
limited help in government-sponsored programs like shelters for battered women, support
groups, and legal and social services. However, they face strong opposition from their religious
and cultural institutions in utilizing these services.").
77. Id. at 242.
78. Haj-Yahia, Battering in Arab Society, supra note 35, at 238, 239-40 (attributing this
response to "the prevailing belief that the children's best interests, the woman's personal
reputation, and the reputation of her family of origin take precedence over her own well-being
and safety").
79. Douki et al., supra note 12, at 169 ("[E]ven texts which imply that violence is
permissible do not mean that it is desirable. Such a measure should always be seen as an
extreme, preferable to divorce, a 'lesser of two evils' which may be used to save a marriage
threatened by a wife's misconduct.").
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believed "marriage must be saved at all costs"-even when domestic violence occurs-
and that a realistic solution was "forgiving and forgetting the abuse."80 Older studies of
female victims show that they overwhelmingly received this type of advice from clergy.
A 1981 study of abused women found that of the 28% who asked clergy for advice, 80/6
were told either to go back home since it's a wife's duty, to forgive their husbands, or to
go to a marriage counselor, or received only religious advice.81 A 1988 survey of
conservative Protestant pastors found that 92% of respondents would "never advise a
woman to divorce an abuser.0 2 These same religious leaders felt that "the victim's lack
of submissive behavior was in part responsible for the violence.
8 3
Clearly, no religious group is immune from violence. States should weigh carefully
the risks to women and children before ceding jurisdiction over family disputes to bodies
that may be unwilling or unable to vindicate their rights. The next Part demonstrates that
giving deference to religious understandings of marriage will materially change the
calculus a woman makes in deciding to leave, or not leave, an abusive relationship.
IV The Practical Effects ofReligious Deference
Society polices and regulates family relations in a number of different
ways: through the criminal law; through the child abuse and neglect system;
through civil domestic violence statutes; and through the law of marriage and
divorce.84 Admittedly, none of the proposals in Part II is intended to remove
the existing protections of criminal law or the child abuse and neglect or
domestic violence statutes. But those systems are reactive, and they have a
80. Colleen Shannon-Lewy & Valerie T. Dull, The Response of Christian Clergy to
Domestic Violence: Help or Hindrance?, 10 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 647, 649 (2005)
(citing AL MILES, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: WHAT EVERY PASTORNEEDS TO KNOW 149-50 (2000)).
81. Mildred Daley Pagelow, Secondary Battering andAlternatives of Female Victims to
Spouse Abuse, in WOMEN AND CRIME IN AMERICA 277,287-88 (Lee H. Bowker ed., 1981).
82. Shannon-Lewy & Dull, supra note 80, at 651 (citing J. M. Alsdurf& P. Alsdurf, A
Pastoral Response, in WHEN PRAYING ISN'T ENOUGH 165, 168 (Anne L. Horton & J. A.
Williamson eds., 1990)).
83. Id. at 167; see also Heidi M. Levitt & Kimberly N. Ware, Religious Leaders'
Perspectives on Marriage, Divorce and Intimate Partner Violence, 30 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 212
(2006) (concluding from a study of 22 religious leaders in Memphis, Tennessee, across many
different religious traditions, that "[a]lthough there was diversity in beliefs, most of the leaders
expressed concerns related to balancing the sacredness of marriage with the urgency of divorce
in cases of [interpersonal violence]. Many suggested that divorce be considered as a 'last resort'
and would urge reconciliation if possible").
84. See generally HOMER H. CLARK, JR. & ANN LAQUER ESTIN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS:
CASES AND PROBLEMS (7th ed. 2005).
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woeful track record of preventing abuse before it occurs.85 The law of marriage and
divorce empowers spouses to exit relationships on equitable terms without harsh
sanctions that some religious norms would impose. As a result, the state must
empower women to exit abusive relationships when they are victims of violence
themselves or believe their children are being victimized.
By giving deference to religious understandings that are not now held by both
adults, society increases the cost to women who want to exit for their own safety or
the safety of their children. To make the collision between religious norms and
safety more concrete, consider Muslim practices about custody.86 Under Islamic
law, male children over the age of seven are placed in the custody of their fathers
upon divorce, as are female children after the onset of puberty. 7 In some Muslim
communities in the world, like Western Thrace, a geographic region of Greece, a
woman must waive "her right to the custody of the children" before she can receive
88a divorce. Presently in the United States, the best interests of the child would
control this decision in nearly every jurisdiction, which may or may not result in
paternal custody.89 Imagine the catch-22 that some women may find themselves in
if we enforce Muslim understandings about custody. If a father is harshly
disciplining his son-discipline that outside the community might be seen as child
abuse-and we enforce the religious norms about custody against the woman, she
then is in a classic bind. If she stays, her child continues to be beaten. Yet if she
exits, her child stays with the husband and continues to be beaten.
To avoid precisely this catch-22, the proposals for giving greater deference
attempt to cherry pick-that is, they propose to give deference to some religious
norms about the adult relationship but to leave decisions about children to the
state.90 Yet, the adult relationship cannot be so neatly divorced from what
85. See generally Robin Fretwell Wilson, Sexually Predatory Parents and the Children in
Their Care: Remove the Threat, Not the Child, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, CULTURE AND
VIOLENCE 39 (Nancy E. Dowd, Dorothy G. Singer & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2006).
86. See 0. Spies, Hadana, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM (P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E.
Bosworth, E. van Donzel & W.P. Heinrichs eds., 2007) (describing the different schools of
Islamic law pertaining to child custody).
87. M. Hashim Kamali, Islamic Law: Personal Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION
4705, 4711 (Lindsay Jones ed., 2d ed. 2005). While the mother maintains custody over young
children in the event of divorce, she loses this right if she remarries. Id. at 4711.
88. Aspasia Tsaoussi & Eleni Zervogianni, Multiculturalism andFamily Law: The Case
of Greek Muslims, in COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN FAMILY LAW 1, 8 (forthcoming 2007).
89. See Patrick Parkinson, The Past Caretaking Standard in Comparative Perspective, in
RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 446 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) [hereinafter RECONCEviNG
THE FAMILY].
90. See supra Part II.
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happens with the children. What happens between the adults affects a woman's
ability to protect her children. For example, if the adult understanding would
result in certain poverty for the woman and her children upon divorce, then she
may not leave the relationship.
In many instances, enforcing the religious understanding about the adults'
relationship would hasten just such a result. Consider property distribution under
Islamic religious law. Islamic marriage contracts often include a deferred mahr
that is to be paid upon the husband's death or a divorce.91 In some instances,
payment of a mahr upon divorce would facilitate exit from the relationship-for
example, if a mahr provided for half of the man's property upon divorce and he
was wealthy.92 But some religious authorities preclude payment of the mahr to a
wife if she initiates the divorce.93 Other authorities go further, requiring a wife to
"waive[] her right to alimony" before they will grant a divorce. 94 Now, if society
defers to religious authorities, divorce on these terms could impoverish the wife
and her child. Threatened with the prospect of certain poverty, some women will
surely be forced to stay in an abusive relationship.
Not only should policymakers worry about concrete outcomes in specific
cases,95 but they should also worry about the expressive effect of giving
deference to religious understandings about the adult relationship. The mere
91. See Spies, supra note 86 (describing mahr as "the gift which the bridegroom has to
give the bride when the contract of marriage is made and which becomes property of the wife").
The mahr may be paid at the time of the contract, or alternatively, the parties may agree to defer
it. Kamali, supra note 87, at 4707 ("A deferred dower remains a debt on the part of the husband
and is payable upon the dissolution of the marriage by death or divorce.").
92. See Ann L. Estin, Embracing Tradition: Pluralism in American Family Law, 63 MD.
L. REV. 540, 571 (2004) (describing a California case where a court would not enforce a mahr
because it encouraged "profiteering by divorce").
93. See Mosa Sayed, The Muslim Dower (mahr) in Europe-with Special Reference to
Sweden, in EUROPEAN CHALLENGES IN CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW: THIRD CONFERENCE
ORGANIZED BY THE COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN FAMILY LAW AND THE DEPARTMENT OF PRIVATE
LAW, UNIVERSITY OF OSLO: CONFERENCE BOOKLET 23 (2007) (citing an Egyptian law that allows
a woman to bypass the husband's unilateral right of divorce by initiating divorce herself but
requires that she give up all her sharia rights and return the mahr); see also Kamali, supra note
87, at 4708 (describing a type of divorce, khul, that the wife initiates and in which the "wife
secures her release from the marital tie by offering the husband financial consideration,
commonly return of the dower").
94. Tsaoussi & Zervogianni, supra note 88, at 8.
95. There are other areas where religious and societal norms will diverge, including how
to treat the marriage of minors, arranged marriages, and polygamous marriages. See id. at 11
(discussing departures between Sharia family law and Greek civil law). Zelinsky acknowledges
in his proposal that a system of deference would have to include specific rules about such
marriages. Zelinsky, supra note 20, at 1184.
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fact that some religious understandings about property and other matters will be
enforced may lead a woman to believe that all such understandings will be
enforced, including those about custody. At the very least, a scheme of deference is
going to require extensive public education about what receives deference and what
does not.
Indeed, any scheme of deference will require numerous safeguards to ensure
that the parties have knowingly bound themselves to a specific, shared
understanding in advance-although the nature of the safeguards may differ
depending on the particular scheme. Zelinsky argues, for example, for the
enforcement of standard-form religious contracts. 96  Yet ordinary prenuptial
agreements are subjected to exacting review for voluntariness, complete disclosure,
representation by separate counsel, and other procedural protections before they are
enforced against the parties.97 Moreover, all the ordinary concerns that courts have
over the ability of prospective spouses to bargain at arm's length and appreciate the
consequences are exacerbated when a religious body, which can exert considerable
influence on its members,98 supplies the standard form contract. It is not clear from
the proposals described in Part II that such protections would be in place.99
Sharing jurisdiction with religious bodies over family matters is fraught with
risk for vulnerable parties as well. Given the routine acceptance of family violence
by some religious communities,' ° it seems unlikely that these communities will
relax the application of harsh financial understandings in instances of domestic
violence, as courts routinely do when there is a material change of circumstances
after the execution of a prenuptial agreement.' 1
Neither is it clear that the determination of a religious body will track the
parties' understanding of their duties going into the relationship, or that like cases
96. Zelinsky, supra note 20, at 1182-84.
97. Brian H. Bix, The ALI Principles andAgreements: Seeking a Balance Between Status
and Contract, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 89, at 372, 373-74 (2006).
Importantly, covenant marriages, on which Professor Nichols relies heavily as an example of
multi-tiered marriage, include numerous protections for the parties. See, e.g., Katherine Shaw
Spaht, Postmodern Marriage as Seen Through the Lens ofthe ALl's 'Compensatory Payments,'
in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 89, at 249, 265 (requiring premarital counseling and a
Declaration of Intent).
98. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
99. As Professor Crane acknowledges, "leaving marriage up to families or mediating
institutions [c]ould render marriage a more oppressive institution to women," as critics charge.
Crane, supra note 26, at 1223. Crane, however, does not address these issues, finding them
"outside the purview of [his] essay." Id.
100. See supra Part III.B.
101. Bix, supra note 97, at 373-74.
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will be treated alike. A live example of shared jurisdiction operates today in
Western Thrace. 0 2 Muslims in Western Thrace are the "only official minority
recognized by the Greek government"' 103 and enjoy unique independence as a
result of the Treaty of Lausanne, signed by Turkey and Greece in 1923 to
accommodate Turks living in Greece and Greeks living in Turkey.' °4 Muslims in
Western Thrace maintain their own religious and legal institutions, headed by
three religious leaders, or Muftis.105 Under Sharia law, the Muftis "conduct all
matters related to civil law."'1 6 The decisions of the Mufti are not final judgments
unless declared enforceable by the Greek courts, but review of those judgments is
"restricted: it may only be examined, whether the Mufti remained within his field
of competence and whether the law applied contravenes the Constitution."'07 The
judgments of the Mufti are routinely declared enforceable; in one study, Greek
civil courts "denied enforceability in only eleven cases out of 2,679."' 0' This was
so even though Sharia family law departs significantly from Greek civil law in
four important areas: polygamy, namely polygyny; the marriage of minors;
divorce proceedings, especially the repudiation of the wife by her husband
(talaq); and post-divorce child custody awards.10 9 Importantly, because there is
no system of appellate review for decisions under Sharia law as there is with
other judicial systems, there is no guarantee of consistent decisions between
jurisdictions."1 The social pressure among Muslims in Western Thrace is so
strong that, even when likely facing an unfavorable outcome, "the vast majority of
cases are brought before the Mufti, even when the plaintiff is the weaker party."' 11
None of the proposals in Part H address such potential inequities.
102. A Muslim minority of about 110,000 lives in Western Thrace. Irini Lagani, Greece's
Muslim Minority in Western Thrace, in 3 BRIEFING NOTES ON ISLAM, SOCIETY, AND POLITcs 8, 8
(2000). These Muslims of Turkish origin are Greek citizens.
103. Id. at9.
104. Id. at 8. The treaty "was based on the principle of reciprocal obligations on the part of
the two countries toward each of these minority groups," and "contains specific obligations
relating to the cultural and religious rights of these communities." Id.
105. Id. at9.
106. Id.
107. Tsaoussi & Zervogianni, supra note 88, at 5.
108. Id. at 11.
109. Id. at 7-10.
110. See David S. Powers, On JudicialReview in Islamic Law, 26 LAw& SoC'y REV. 315,
315 (1992) ("The prevailing wisdom among Islamicists for over a half-century has asserted that
there are no appellate structures in Islamic law, that the decision of a judge is final and
irrevocable, and that a judgment may not be reversed under any circumstances.").
111. Id. at 12.
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V A Cautionary Tale of Deference
In the United States, deference to religious understandings of the need for
medical treatment has had tragic effects. Generally, parents have a duty to provide
their children all necessary medical treatment 12 Two mechanisms exist to discourage
and punish parental failures to treat: civil child abuse and neglect laws and criminal
charges, such as manslaughter. In many states, however, parents are shielded from
both civil and criminal liability by religious exemptions that "allow religious
parents... to refuse medical care for their sick children.""' 3 Thirty-nine states give
religious exemptions to civil charges, and thirty-three states allow religious defenses to
criminal charges. 1 4 The costs of this deference are heart-breaking.
A 1998 study by Asser and Swan reviewed 172 child deaths across the country
from 1975 to 1995 in which the children were denied medical care as a result of
parental beliefs in faith healing. 115 The results are chilling. Of the 172 children
studied, 140 would have had a 90% chance of survival with medical intervention.16
112. See generally 2 ANN M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOpTION
CASES § 18.03 (1993).
113. Richard A. Hughes, The Death of Children by Faith-Based Medical Neglect, 20 J.L. &
RELIGION 247, 248 (2004-2005). The federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act originally
required states to exempt faith-based denials from the child abuse statutes as a condition of receiving
child abuse funds. The statute was later amended to permit states, but not require them, to have such
exemptions.
114. 1d. Only five states (Hawaii, North Carolina, Nebraska, Maryland, and Massachusetts) do
not exempt faith-based denials from civil or criminal charges. Id.
In theory, even when there is an exemption, the state may intervene in the family to authorize the
treatment on the child's behalf. See Joan H. Krause, Freedom or Responsibility: When Spiritual
Healing Fails, 32 (Summer 1991) (unpublished paper,-on file with author) (noting that while a spiritual
exemption "shields the parents from liability, it does not prevent the state from aiding the children").
But in practice, the state rarely knows about the denial until after the child's death because the family
does not seek any medical treatment, making civil and criminal charges essential to changing treatment
practices in insular communities. See Hughes, supra note 113, at 247 (noting that in response to the
deaths of seventy-eight children in Oregon within the Followers of Christ Church, the Oregon
legislature amended Oregon's laws in 1999 to permit prosecution ofparents who failed to seek medical
care for their injured or sick children, and that between the time of the amendment in 1999 and 2003,
there were no deaths of children whose parents belonged to the Followers of Christ Church).
Further, when there are faith-based exemptions, child protective service caseworkers and other
officials often believe they cannot intervene to protect the child even when they know about the denial.
See, e.g., Seth M. Asser & Rita Swan, Child Fatalitiesfrom Religion-Motivated Medical Neglect, 101
PEDIATRICS 625, 628 (1998) ("Believing they were powerless in the face of the parents' wishes, some
teachers ignored obvious symptoms and sent lessons home to bedridden children. Some social
workers and law enforcement officers allowed parents to decline examinations of children reported to
be ill.").
115. Asser&Swan, supranote 114, at625.
116. Id.
1382
THE OVERLOOKED COSTS OF RELIGIOUS DEFERENCE
Eighteen more would have had better than a 50/50 chance."17 Thus, 158 of the
children, or 92%, would more probably than not have survived if they had received
medical treatment."' 8
Significantly, the researchers also separated cancer deaths from non-cancer
deaths because the prognosis for cancer is especially hard to predict.1 9 The results for
children without cancer are equally sobering. Out of 98 children who died as a result
of non-cancer deaths, 92 would have had "an excellent prognosis with commonly
available medical and surgical care," four would likely have had a good outcome, and
only two "would not have clearly benefited from [commonly available medical and
surgical] care.'
20
Asser and Swan's study did not include 78 child deaths in Oregon between 1955
and 1998 or 12 child deaths in Idaho between 1980 and 1998.12 The deaths in those
two states resulted from "faith healing practices that occurred within the Oregon-based
Followers of Christ Church."' 122 Of the Oregon children who died, it is likely that 21
"could have lived if they had received medical treatment." 1
23
So, injust this handful of reports, more than 150 children are dead because states
prized deference over the child's welfare. Clearly, children in families that practice
faith healing are not more disease riddled than other children. Rather these tragic,
preventable deaths arose because we removed the state's protection from some of our
most vulnerable members. Given our experience with faith-based exemptions, there
would seem to be no compelling reason to stand back and watch the predictable
repercussions of deference unfold again.
V. Conclusion
Religious communities are not hot spots for family violence, but they do
experience family violence just like the rest of society does. The costs of giving
greater deference to religious understandings of family relationships must seriously be
considered before we are willing to leave the decisions about marriage and divorce to
religious communities--robbing women and children of the state's protections.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 626.
120. Id.
121. Hughes, supra note 113, at 247.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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